We provide a strong security notion for broadcast encryption, called adaptive security in the multichallenge setting (MA-security), where the adversary can adaptively have access to the key generation oracle and the encryption oracle many times (multichallenge). The adversary specially can query for the challenge ciphertexts on different target user sets adaptively, which generalizes the attacks against broadcast encryptions in the real world setting. Our general result shows that the reduction of the adaptive secure broadcast encryption will lose a factor of in the MA setting, where is the maximum number of encryption queries. In order to construct tighter MA-secure broadcast encryptions, we investigate Gentry and Water's transformation and show that their transformation can preserve MA-security at the price of reduction loss on the advantage of the underlying symmetric key encryption. Furthermore, we remove the -type assumption in Gentry and Water's semistatically secure broadcast encryption by using Hofheinz-Koch-Striecks techniques. The resulting scheme instantiated in a composite order group is MA-secure with constant-size ciphertext header.
Introduction
Broadcast encryptions (BE), introduced by Fiat and Naor [1] , allow a sender to broadcast encrypted messages in such a way that only a specified group of users can decrypt the messages. Such schemes are useful in many applications, for example, pay-TV systems, internet multicasting of video and music, DVD content protection, file system access control, and wireless sensor networks [2] . One basic security requirement for broadcast encryption is the fully collusion resistance, which means that even a coalition of all users outside of target user set learns nothing about the target plaintext. Naor et al. [3] proposed a fully collusion secure broadcast encryption scheme with the private key overhead (log 2 ( )), where is the total number of users. Subsequent works [4, 5] reduced the private key size to (log ). However, the ciphertexts size of collusion resistant schemes, for example, [3] [4] [5] [6] , usually grows linearly with either the number of receivers or the number of revoked users. Boneh et al. [7] constructed a fully collusion secure broadcast encryption systems with low ciphertext overhead and short secret keys. But the security of their scheme was proven in a static model, where the adversary needs to choose the target user set before seeing the system parameter. To capture more powerful attacks, Gentry and Waters [8] provided a stronger security model, called adaptive security, where the adversary can compromise users' keys and choose the target user set adaptively. They showed a generic method to construct adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme by transforming semistatically secure broadcast encryption scheme, while the underlying semistatically secure scheme in [8] is based on a -type assumption, which is considered to be too strong. By introducing the dual system, Waters [9] presented a broadcast encryption scheme with ciphertext overhead of constant size, and the resulting scheme can be proven adaptively secure under static assumption (non--type assumption). Then, Boneh, Waters, and Zhandry [10] made use of multilinear maps to construct a broadcast encryption where ciphertext overhead, private key size, and public key size are all poly-logarithmic in . Other works [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] focus on the improvements of broadcast encryptions with special functionalities, for example, identity-based BE, anonymous BE, and traitor-tracing BE. Recently, Wee [16] presented the first broadcast encryption scheme with constant-size ciphertext overhead, constant-size user secret keys, and linear-size public parameters under static assumptions, while the resulting scheme is proven secure under static security model.
It is worth noting that although adaptive security defined in [8] seems strong enough to capture the security of broadcast encryptions, attacks in the real world are more complex, 2 Security and Communication Networks for example, the adversary may adaptively get multiple challenge ciphertexts instead of only one. Such attacks are described in the so-called multiuser, multichallenge setting. Bellare et al. [17] initiated the study of the formal security in the multiuser setting, which shows that one-user, one-ciphertext security implies security in the multiuser, multichallenge setting. But the reduction loss of the proof is ⋅ , where and denote the number of users and the number of challenge ciphertexts per user, respectively. However, large reduction loss usually implies large cryptographic parameters, which leads to low efficiency in practice. Recent breakthrough was made by Hofheinz and Jager [18] , which provided the first IND-CCA secure PKE in the multiuser/multichallenge setting and the security tightly relates to the decision linear assumption. Here, tight security means that the security loss is a constant. Hofheinz, Koch, and Striecks [19] extended Chen and Wee's proof technique [20] to the multiuser/multichallenge setting and provided an almost tightly secure identity-based encryption (IBE) in the same setting, where the security loss only relies on the security parameter instead of the number of queries or instances of the scheme. Hence, an extension of broadcast encryptions in the multiuser/multichallenge setting is natural. However, the problem of constructing tightly secure broadcast encryptions in the multiuser/multichallenge setting is more subtle.
Our Contribution. We define a stronger notion for broadcast encryption, called the adaptive security in the multichallenge setting (MA-security), where the adversary can not only adaptively have access to the key generation oracle and the encryption oracle many times (multichallenge) but also adaptively query for the challenge ciphertexts on different target user sets instead of only one target set as in previous security model. Since each target user set is actually the combination of different users chosen by the adversary adaptively, it is more challenging for the reduction algorithm to prepare the parameters of broadcast encryptions than that of ordinary PKE or IBE.
Our general result shows that the reduction of the adaptive secure broadcast encryption will lose a factor of in the MA setting, where is the maximum number of encryption queries. To achieve tighter MA-security, we investigate the following two methods. The first method is from Gentry and Waters transformation [8] mentioned above. By exploring the random self-reducibility of BDHE assumption, we show that their transformation still holds in terms of MA-security, but at the cost of reduction loss on the advantage of underlying symmetric key encryption. We emphasize that the resulting broadcast encryption scheme's security depends on both the BDHE assumption and the security of the symmetric key encryption. The reduction loss on the underlying symmetric key encryption is , while the reduction on BDHE is tight due to the random self-reducibility of BDHE assumption, which is not implied by the general result of [17] . To remove the BDHE assumption, our second method applies the HofheinzKoch-Striecks techniques [19] to Gentry-Waters' semistatic secure broadcast encryption. The resulting scheme is essentially the Hofheinz-Koch-Striecks IBE scheme instantiated in a composite order group, while the user's decryption key of broadcast encryption is expressed in a different way from that of [19] . Both methods can turn Gentry-Waters' semistatically secure broadcast encryption into a MA-secure one with constant-size ciphertext header.
Note that the public key size of both schemes is linear with the number of users. An interesting problem is how to reduce the public key size of a MA-secure broadcast encryption under standard assumptions while preserving constant ciphertext header size.
Preliminaries
Notations. Let [1, ] fl {1, . . . , }, where ∈ N. For a finite set S, we denote by ← S the fact that is picked uniformly at random from S. can be denoted as a binary string; that is, = 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where ∈ {0, 1} for ∈ [1, ] . We write vectors in bold font; for example, K = ( 0 , . . . , 2 ) for a vector of length 2 + 1. SD( ; ) denotes the statistical distance of and , where and are random variables. We say and are -close if SD( ; ) ≤ .
Bilinear Map.
Let G and G be two groups of prime order , and let be a generator of G. : G × G → G is a bilinear map with the following properties.
(1) Bilinearity: for all , V ∈ G and , ∈ Z, ( , V ) = ( , V) .
(2) Nondegeneracy: ( , ) ̸ = 1.
(3) Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute ( , V), for any , V ∈ G.
Assumptions
Decisional BDHE Problem [8] . Let (G, G , , ) be the description of the group parameter which is the output of group generator G( ), where is the security parameter. Choose ← {0, 1} and given 2 + 2 elements
where , ← Z * , ← ( ,
+1
) if = 0 and ← G if = 1. The problem is to guess .
The decisional BDHE assumption states that for any PPT adversary A which takes as inputs the description of (G, G , ) and the above elements and outputs * , the advantage
is negligible in .
Broadcast Encryption Systems.
A broadcast encryption system consists of four randomized algorithms described below. ( , ℓ). Take as input the number of users and the maximal size ℓ ≤ of a broadcast recipient group and output a public/secret key pair (PK, SK). (The security parameter is taken as parts of the input implicitly.) ( , ). Take as input a user index ∈ [1, ] and the secret key SK and output a private key .
( , ). Take a user set ⊆ [1, ] and the public key PK as input. It outputs a pair ( , ), where is the header and ∈ K is the message encryption key from a key space K.
( , , , , ). Take as input a user set ⊆ [1, ], a user index ∈ [1, ] , and the corresponding private key for user , a header , and the public key PK. If ∈ , then the algorithm outputs the message encryption key ∈ K.
Adaptive Security in the Multichallenge
Setting (MA-Security)
In this section, we define the adaptive security of broadcast encryption in the multichallenge setting. Let BE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a broadcast encryption scheme. The experiment for BE is described in Table 1 . During the experiment, the adversary A takes and the description of BE including PK as inputs and A can have access to the following two kinds of oracles. A broadcast encryption scheme BE is adaptively secure in the multichallenge setting (MA-secure) if, for any PPT adversary A, the advantage
is negligible in . To investigate Gentry and Waters transformation in the multichallenge setting, we also need to extend semistatic security defined in [8] to the multichallenge setting, which is called semistatic security in the multichallenge setting (MSsecurity). The MS-security is defined in a similar way as that of MA-security, where the adversary also takes and the description of BE including PK as inputs and can have access to O (⋅, SK) and O Enc (⋅, PK) as defined in MA-security. But additional restrictions in MS-security are that A has to choose a target user set * at the beginning of the experiment and encryption queries are such that ⊆ * . Details of MS experiment are shown in Table 2 A broadcast encryption scheme BE is semistatically secure in the multichallenge setting (MS-secure) if, for any PPT adversary A, the advantage
MA-Secure Broadcast Encryption
First we give a general result on the reduction loss of an adaptive secure broadcast encryption in the MA setting. Then, to derive a tighter reduction, we show how to extend Gentry-Waters transformation to the multichallenge setting and construct a concrete MA-secure broadcast encryption based on BDHE assumption. 
General Construction
Proof. The proof proceeds via the following games.
(i) Game 0 : Game 0 is the real MA experiment except the following differences. When the adversary adaptively makes encryption query for set , the challenger responds with Enc( , PK) = ( , 0, ), where ∈ [1, Enc ].
(ii) Game 1 : Game 1 is identical to Game 0 except that the challenger replies the encryption queries with Let Game 0, = 1 denote the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Game 0, . Note that Game 0,0 and Game 0, Enc are identical to Game 0 and Game 1 , respectively. Thus,
Next, we show that |Pr[Game 0,
That is, if there exists a PPT adversary A 1 which can distinguish the adjacent games for some , we can construct a PPT algorithm B which can break the adaptive security of the underlying scheme.
Claim (Game 0, −1 Game 0, ). For any PPT adversary A 1 which can make at most key = key ( ) key generation queries and Enc = Enc ( ) encryption queries with running time , there exists algorithm B with about the same running time as A 1 , such that
Proof. B simulates the experiment as follows.
(i) The challenger runs Setup( , ℓ) and sends PK to B which will send PK to A 1 . 
Observe that if = 1, A 1 's view is identical to that of Game 0. . Otherwise A 1 's view is identical to that of Game 0. −1 . Thus
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Hence we have
which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
MS-Secure Broadcast Encryption Based on BDHE
Assumption. To reduce the reduction loss, we investigate Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption [8] in the MA setting. First we briefly recall the semistatically secure broadcast encryption scheme in [8] . Let G( , ) be a PPT algorithm which takes as input the security parameter and the number of users and generates the description of group parameter (G, G , , ), where G, G denotes the group of prime order = ( , ) and is the bilinear map.
, ℎ 1 , . . . , ℎ are generators of G and ← Z . Set
Output (PK, SK).
( , ). Choose ← Z and output user 's private key
Output ( , ).
( , , , , ). If ∈ , parse as ( ,0 , . . . , , ) and as ( 1 , 2 ) and output 
The proof is similar to that of [8] except that we have to deal with multiple challenges in the simulation. Furthermore, to derive a tighter reduction, we need the following lemma which makes use of the random self-reducibility of BDHE. 
where = ( , ) and , ∈ Z .
where , V ← Z . Let = − mod . We implicitly set
Hence, we have
Since V are uniformly distributed, we have uniformly distributed over Z .
Next, more details of the concrete proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix A.
Transforming MS-Security to MA-Security.
In this section, we show that Gentry-Waters transformation still holds in the multichallenge setting, but at the cost of reduction loss Enc in the advantage of underlying symmetric encryption scheme. First, we briefly recall Gentry-Waters transformation [8] . Let BE MS = (Setup MS , KeyGen MS , Enc MS , Dec MS ) be a MS-secure broadcast system and Π sym = (SymSetup, SymEnc, SymDec) be a symmetric encryption scheme with key space K .
. Let ← {0, 1} and denotes th bit of . Let PK = and SK = ( , ). Output (PK, SK).
( , ). Run KeyGen MS (2 − , ) → . Set = ( , ). Output private key . ( , ). Generate random | | bits: ← { ← {0, 1} : ∈ } and ← K. Set
Output (  , ). ( , , , , ). Parse as ( 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , ) and as ( , i ). Set 0 and 1 as above. Run
Output . 
Theorem 5. For any PPT adversary
Notice that Adv CPA B,Π sym ( ) denotes the advantage of Π sym = (SymSetup, SymEnc, SymDec), which is defined by the following one-time symmetric key IND-CPA experiment described in Table 3 .
During the experiment, A takes the security parameter and the description of Π sym as input and can make only one encryption query to encryption oracle O Enc ( , ⋅). More precisely, chooses a pair of plaintexts ( 0 , 1 ) of the same length as the query and O Enc ( , ⋅) returns SymEnc( , ) as the challenge ciphertext.
We say the symmetric key encryption scheme Π sym is one-time CPA-secure if, for any PPT adversary A, the advantage
is negligible in , where the probability is taken over the random coins used in the experiment, as well as the random coins used by A.
Proof of Sketch. The main idea of the proof is similar to that of [8] except that we need to deal with multiple challenges, which incurs a reduction loss in the advantage of symmetric key encryption scheme. More precisely, we need to prove the indistinguishability of the following games.
(i) Game 0 is identical to Exp The indistinguishability among Game 0 , Game 1 , and Game 2 relies on the MS-security of BE. By using hybrid arguments, we show the indistinguishability between Game 2 and Game 3 (Game 3 and Game 4 ), which relies on the one-time CPA security of the underlying symmetric key encryption. It is easy to check that the adversary has no advantage in Game 4 . More details are shown in Appendix B.
Remove -Type Assumption
In this section, we show how to remove the -type assumption of the MS-secure Gentry-Waters scheme in Section 4 by using Hofheinz-Koch-Striecks techniques [19] , where the original Gentry-Waters scheme is lifted to composite order groups.
Let G( , 4) be a composite-order group generator which generates group parameters ( , , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 
. In addition, the resulting scheme relies on the following assumptions [19] . 
Dual System Assumption 1 (DS1)
, , , , ← Z * .
(31)
Construction
( , ). Generate , 1 , . . . , 2 ← Z and compute ( 1 ,
, and compute (ℎ 1 , . . . , ℎ 2 ) = (
Output (mpk, msk). 
(34)
Note that 2 is not used in .
( , mpk). Take a set ⊆ [1, ] as well as a master public key mpk as input. We denote as a binary string; that is, = 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where ∈ {0, 1} and ∈ [1, ] . That is, = 1 if user is in . Otherwise, = 0. Generate ← Z and output
( , , , , mpk). If ∈ , parse as ( 0 , 1 , . . . , msk ⋅ 2 −1 , 2 +1 , . . . , 2 ) and as ( 0 , 1 ) and output
Correctness. 
Security Proof
The proof follows that of [19] and proceeds via a series of games described in Appendix C, where the user set is considered as a special kind of identity .
The main difference between games is presented in Table 4 . Random function families, auxiliary secret key generation, auxiliary encryption function, semifunctional user secret keys, pseudo-normal ciphertexts, and semifunctional ciphertexts are defined as follows. More details can be found in Table 4 . ; | →̂, wherê← Z * ; | →̃, wherẽ← Z * .
(ii) Auxiliary Secret Key Generation
KeyGen ( , msk, K)
where
.
(iv) Semi-Functional Type-i User Secret Keys
KeyGen ( , msk ⋅RF ( | ) ⋅RF ( | ) , K)
where user = 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ is denoted as . 
{1,2}
) and denotes
{1,3}
Appendix

A. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. If there exists a PPT adversary A which can break the MS-security of the broadcast encryption, then we show how to construct a PPT algorithm B to break BDHE assumption. Upon receiving the BDHE problem instance, which consists of ( , , , (ii) Setup. B generates 0 , . . . , ← Z and sets
is unknown, we implicitly set = 0 ⋅ +1 and ( , ) can be computed as ( , ) 0 . Now the public key is PK = (G, G , ; , ( , ) , ℎ 1 , . . . , ℎ ) .
(A.2)
B sends PK to A. Eventually, A outputs a bit which is also the output of B. It is easy to check that B perfectly simulates Exp MS A,BE ( ). Therefore, B's advantage in deciding the BDHE instance is precisely A's advantage against the MS-security of the broadcast encryption scheme, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Let Game = 1 denote the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Game .
Game 0 . This is the real game which is identical to experiment Exp (iii) The challenger runs Setup MS to obtain (PK , SK ) and sends PK to A 1 . Then B 1 sets PK ← PK and sends PK to A. (vii) The challenger sends back ( 0, ,
0, ) ← Enc MS ( 0, , PK ) and 
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We construct a series of subgame 2, for = 1, . . . , Enc , to prove the indistinguishability between Game 2 and Game 3.
(i) Game 2,1 . Game 2,1 is identical to Game 2 except that the challenger chooses 0,1 ← K to construct 0,1 ← SymEnc ( 0,1 , 0,1 ).
(ii) Game 2, . Game 2, is identical to Game 2, −1 except that the challenger chooses 0, ← K to construct 0, ← SymEnc( 0, , 0, ).
Note that
Proof. A 3 chooses * ← {0, 1} and simulates the experiment as follows. Observe that if = 1, M's view is identical to that of Game 2, −1 . Otherwise, M's view is identical to that of Game 2, . Thus
which concludes the proof of the Claim. Due to the Claim, we have
(Game 4 Game 3 ). Game 4 is identical to Game 3 except that the challenger sets 1,
The proof of the indistinguishability between Game 4 and Game 3 is similar to that of Game 3 and Game 2 . So we have
In Game 4 , all 0, , 1, , 0, , 1, for ∈ [1, Enc ] are chosen at random and * is independent of , . Hence, the adversary has no advantage. That is,
(B.9)
C. Proof of Theorem 6
Game Sequence (iv) Game 2, ,1 is the same as Game 2, ,0 except that if th bit of a challenge identity * is 0 (i.e., * = 0), then the corresponding challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∧, − 1). Otherwise, the corresponding challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∼ , − 1).
(v) Game 2, ,2 is the same as Game 2, ,1 except that if th bit of a challenge identity * is 0 (i.e., * = 0), then the corresponding challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∧, ). Otherwise, the corresponding challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∼, ).
(vi) Game 3 is the same as Game 2, ,0 except that all the challenge ciphertexts and user secret keys are semifunctional of type-(∧, ) and semifunctional of type-, respectively.
(vii) Game 4 is the same as Game 3 except that the challenge keys output by oracle O Enc (⋅, mpk) are uniform bitstrings over {0, 1} . 
Proof. B 1 receives the instance ( , , , , , 1 , 3 , 4 , ) from the challenger, where
, and simulates the experiment for A as follows.
Setup. Choose a bit ← {0, 1}. Pick , 1 , . . . , 2 ← Z and compute ( 1 ,
Key Generation Queries. To answer key generation queries
← Z * and compute 4, = 4 for
, where ← Z * , and return
KeyGen( , msk, K).
Encryption Queries. A can adaptively make encryption queries at most Enc = Enc ( ) times. B 1 sets 
Proof. As shown in Table 4 , msk ← in Game 1 , while msk = msk⋅RF 0 ( )⋅RF 0 ( ) in Game 2,1,0 is also uniform in , where | 0 denotes the empty string . Since the distribution of msk and msk ⋅RF 0 ( ) ⋅RF 0 ( ) is identical, (C.4) holds. 
Encryption Queries. Upon receiving encryption queries * ,
Finally, A outputs a guess bit . B 2 outputs 1 if = ; otherwise 0.
Note that g {1,2} is distributed uniformly over
, the challenge ciphertexts are distributed identically as in Game 2, ,0 . Otherwise, the distribution is the same as in Game 2, ,1 . Hence (C.5) holds. and sets
Lemma C.4 (Game
(C.11) 
, where ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,2 ) ← (Z * ) 2 , and sets
. . .
(C.14)
Thus K ℓ = ( 0 , 1 , . . . , 2 −1 , 2 , . . . , 2 ). For identity ℓ and ℓ ∈ [1, key ], B 3 defines the random functions below:
wherẽℓ,̂ℓ ← Z * . Next B 3 answers ℓ-th secret key generation query for identity ℓ with prefix ℓ | that is not a prefix of an already queried identity as
For an identity prefix ℓ | that is a prefix of an already queried identity, we rerandomize the element of K ℓ .
Encryption Queries. Upon receiving encryption queries * , B 3 chooses ← Z * and returns
Finally, A outputs a guess bit . B 3 outputs 1 if = , otherwise 0. If = ( 2 , 3 ) (i.e., ℓ = (̂ℓ 2 ⋅̂4 ,ℓ ,̃ℓ 3 ⋅̃4 ,ℓ )), then the secret keys are distributed identically as in Game 2, ,1 .
) (i.e., ℓ = (̂ℓ 2 ⋅̂4 ,ℓ ⋅̂ℓ 2 ,̃ℓ 3 ⋅̃4 ,ℓ ⋅̃ℓ 3 )), we have
identically distributed, respectively. Therefore, in this case, the distribution is the same as in Game 2, ,2 . Besides, the distribution of the challenge ciphertexts is identical in these two games. Hence, (C.7) holds. 
Lemma C.5 (Game
In Game 2, ,0 all the challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∧, − 1), while in Game 2, −1,2 if th bit of challenge identity is 0 (i.e., = 0), the challenge ciphertexts are totally identical to those in Game 2, ,0 . Otherwise, the challenge ciphertexts are semifunctional of type-(∼, − 1). Actually, the proof of (Game 2, −1,2 to Game 2, ,0 ) and (Game 2, ,2 to Game 3 ) is similar to that in Lemma C.3 and thus omitted. 
Lemma
Proof. B 4 is provided with the instance ( , ) where is either
where , , , ← Z * . and returns
Setup
H ( (( 1̂2 ) , msk) ⋅ )) .
(C.30)
The distribution of mpk and the requested user secret keys are identical to the real scheme. If = ( 2 , 2 ) = (( 1 2 ) , {2,4} ) and the challenge identity was not queried before,
H ( (( 1̂2 ) , msk ⋅ ( {2,4} ) ))) .
(C.31)
Note that the exponents , , , and are required to be uniformly distributed in Z * , but when we reuse the outputs of Rerand and Rerand , , are uniformly distributed in Z . Since the uniform distribution in Z is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution in Z * , we have that the distribution of challenge ciphertexts are O(2 − )-close to that of Game 3 . Note that we implicitly set̂= . For the challenge identity queried before, we can just rerandomize the previously used query value . If = ( 2 , 2 ) , then 
Disclosure
Parts of this paper are presented at Inscrypt 2016.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.
